The universe, and when the money left
Measured from SEC Form N-PORT structured data, 2019 Q4 – 2026 Q2 (27 quarters), and independently audited 2026-07-28 by a separate agent instructed to break it. Every statistic below carries its denominator in the same sentence.
Of the 18,750 registered funds filing Form N-PORT, 582 defined-outcome series are counted — 471 ETF, 108 insurance separate-account / variable annuity, 3 mutual fund — from 654 name-matched candidates, after 29 were excluded on reading each name, and 30 laddered plus 13 renamed series were held out.
numerator: 582 defined-outcome series · denominator: 18,750 registered funds filing Form N-PORT · as of 2019 Q4 - 2026 Q2 (27 quarters of SEC Form N-PORT structured data) · research/buffer_universe.md, "The universe"
Net assets are $67.6B on the basis stated: each fund's most recent reported net assets, defined-outcome ETFs only, ladders excluded; including ladders and using peak rather than latest assets produces ~$91B — any figure quoted from this market should say which basis it uses.
numerator: $67.6B · denominator: each fund's most recent reported net assets, defined-outcome ETFs only, ladders excluded · as of 2026 Q2 (latest reported) · research/buffer_universe.md, "The universe"
44.3% of $159.7B gross redemptions — $70.7B, measured on 449 of the 471 ETFs over 15,592 fund-months — left mid-period, before the outcome period ended; the dollar total is $103-160B depending on sign treatment, and the share ranges from 34.5% to 72.4% across defensible window choices.
numerator: $70.7B · denominator: $159.7B gross redemptions · as of 2019 Q4 - 2026 Q2 (27 quarters of SEC Form N-PORT structured data) · research/buffer_universe.md, "When the money left"
If exits were spread evenly across the calendar, 80.3% of redeemed dollars would land mid-period, because the term window covers only 19.7% of the observed calendar; the observed 44.3% of $159.7B gross redemptions means exits cluster at term far more than chance — but nearly half the money still leaves early.
numerator: 44.3% of $159.7B gross redemptions · denominator: 19.7% of the observed calendar · as of 2019 Q4 - 2026 Q2 (27 quarters of SEC Form N-PORT structured data) · research/buffer_universe.md, "When the money left"
The two-month window was validated against the data, not assumed: of the 276 annual-series ETFs with at least 18 months of history and $50M of flow, 265 (96%) peak either exactly on the inferred reset month (121) or in the month before (144) — both months genuinely carry the roll.
numerator: 265 (96%) · denominator: 276 annual-series ETFs with at least 18 months of history and $50M of flow · as of 2019 Q4 - 2026 Q2 (27 quarters of SEC Form N-PORT structured data) · research/buffer_universe.md, "When the money left"
In roughly half of the ETFs with any redemptions, most redeemed dollars left outside the term window — but those funds are disproportionately the small ones, about 38% of redeemed dollars and 40% of peak assets, so the fund-count statistic reads stronger than the dollar-weighted one and is not quoted beside it without this note.
numerator: roughly half · denominator: the ETFs with any redemptions · as of 2019 Q4 - 2026 Q2 (27 quarters of SEC Form N-PORT structured data) · research/buffer_universe.md, "When the money left"
Of the 582 defined-outcome series counted, 108 separate-account series sit in the insurance channel that is routinely left out of "buffer ETF" commentary.
numerator: 108 separate-account series · denominator: 582 defined-outcome series counted · as of 2019 Q4 - 2026 Q2 (27 quarters of SEC Form N-PORT structured data) · research/buffer_universe.md, "The universe"
Across the two distributors that account for 84% of all money redeemed from these funds — $68.0B and $66.6B — the share leaving before the outcome period ends is 51% and 34%. A 17-point gap on structurally similar instruments, between the two largest shelves.
numerator: 51% and 34% · denominator: 84% of all money redeemed from these funds · as of 2026-07 · baserates.py SPREAD_NOTE — the dollar-weighted comparison that survives sensitivity; it names no issuer
A mid-period exit is not misconduct. These are aggregate descriptions of fund-level filings — not causal claims, not scores, and not advice.
Sensitivity — the levers, shown in full
Two choices in this measurement are discretionary enough to move the headline. Both are shown whole, so a reader sees the range before deciding what to make of any single figure.
How wide is the end-of-period window?
Used: reset month + prior month — 19.7% of the observed calendar
| window | share of calendar | mid-period result |
|---|---|---|
| reset month only | 10.0% | 72.4% |
| reset + prior month (used) | 19.7% | 44.3% |
| reset + prior two | 29.0% | 39.1% |
| reset + prior three | 36.6% | 34.5% |
The 2-month window is empirically justified — of 276 annual-series ETFs with at least 18 months of history and $50M of flow, 265 (96%) peak exactly on the inferred reset month (121) or in the month before (144) — but the headline ranges from 34.5% to 72.4% across defensible definitions, and a reader is entitled to see that.
How are negative-signed redemption filings treated?
Used: absolute value
| treatment | total redemptions | mid-period share |
|---|---|---|
| absolute value (used) | $159.7B | 44.3% |
| drop negative months | $103.2B | 42.0% |
| treat negatives as zero | $103.2B | 42.0% |
| raw signed sum | $46.7B | 34.4% |
The ratio is robust; the dollar total is not. The total is quoted as "$103-160B depending on sign treatment", never as a bare figure. The raw signed sum is the one indefensible option: filers themselves amend these cells, and every one of the 12 amended values is a sign flip in the same direction.
What this does not show
Carried verbatim from the measurement document — the limits ride with the numbers, not behind a link.
- These are fund-level flows, not investor trades. Creations and redemptions happen when an authorized participant assembles or breaks a basket. An investor who sells shares on the exchange to another investor produces no flow at all. This measures money leaving the fund, which understates how often individual holders turn over.
- Monthly granularity. A redemption on 15 December and one on 31 December are indistinguishable, and only the second is unambiguously at term.
- 22 of 471 ETFs are unmeasured because no reset month can be read from the name.
- Boundary sharpness. Innovator U.S. Equity Power Buffer ETF – December has 38% of its redemptions in November (scored at term) and 17% in October (scored mid-period, despite 11 of 12 months having been held). The window is a line drawn through a continuum.
- Quarterly series get a window spanning 8 of 12 months, so "19.7% of the calendar" is a blend across series types, not a constant.
- Two-year series are treated as resetting annually, which slightly over-credits the window.
- No causal claim. A mid-period exit is not misconduct. Investors have every right to sell, and exits can be forced by circumstance. The number says how often the protection the product advertises could not have been delivered — not why.
research/buffer_universe.md, carried verbatim
An earlier headline about the share of "net exits" leaving mid-period failed falsification — randomly permuting each fund's redemptions across its own months, destroying all exit-timing information, left it essentially unchanged, while the gross statistic collapsed toward its null — so it was deleted and is not quoted here or anywhere. Only the gross figure carries signal.
Where the market’s money went
Each month, every fund in the country tells the SEC how much came in and how much went out. This is that data, reduced to the funds investors put the most money into — and pulled the most out of — across the whole market rather than one broker’s customers. Data vintage: 2025-05 to 2026-06.
Per-issuer shares
fixed alphabetical — never ranked, no sort controls
| issuer | funds | redeemed (denominator) | mid-period |
|---|---|---|---|
| AllianzIM | 46 | $19.3B | 55% |
| Calamos | 32 | $1.3B | 87% |
| First Trust / FT Vest | 108 | $66.6B | 34% |
| Innovator | 173 | $68.0B | 51% |
| iShares | 8 | $0.6B | 68% |
| Pacer Swan | 12 | $1.9B | 29% |
| PGIM | 40 | $0.6B | 19% |
| TrueShares | 22 | $1.3B | 37% |
- AllianzIM: 55% left mid-period, of $19.3B of gross redemptions across 46 funds — a share of that shelf's own redemptions, not of the market.
- Calamos: 87% left mid-period, of $1.3B of gross redemptions across 32 funds — a share of that shelf's own redemptions, not of the market.
- First Trust / FT Vest: 34% left mid-period, of $66.6B of gross redemptions across 108 funds — a share of that shelf's own redemptions, not of the market.
- Innovator: 51% left mid-period, of $68.0B of gross redemptions across 173 funds — a share of that shelf's own redemptions, not of the market.
- iShares: 68% left mid-period, of $0.6B of gross redemptions across 8 funds — a share of that shelf's own redemptions, not of the market.
- Pacer Swan: 29% left mid-period, of $1.9B of gross redemptions across 12 funds — a share of that shelf's own redemptions, not of the market.
- PGIM: 19% left mid-period, of $0.6B of gross redemptions across 40 funds — a share of that shelf's own redemptions, not of the market.
- TrueShares: 37% left mid-period, of $1.3B of gross redemptions across 22 funds — a share of that shelf's own redemptions, not of the market.
The spread is the finding. Behaviour is not a property of the product — it is a property of who sold it and how. PGIM at 19% and Calamos at 87% hold structurally similar instruments.
The endpoints of that 19%-87% spread are the two smallest cells — PGIM at $0.6B and Calamos at $1.3B, together 1.2% of the $159.7B measured. The by-issuer table is computed at the single two-month window, while the aggregate headline swings from 34.5% to 72.4% across defensible windows; that sensitivity has not been re-run per issuer, so the issuer gap sits inside an untested method band.
A mid-period exit is not misconduct, and none of this is a score: these are fund-level flow shares from the issuers' own N-PORT filings, shown with their denominators, in alphabetical order.
Methods — every discretionary choice
End-of-period window definition
A redemption is scored consistent with holding to term if it falls in the reset month or the final month of the outcome period — 19.7% of the observed calendar.
Sensitivity The single largest lever: 72.4% (reset month only) to 34.5% (reset + prior three). Full table above. The 2-month choice is the one 96% of measurable annual series empirically justify.
Sign normalization of redemption cells
Absolute value. 185,934 fund-months across all filers report redemptions as negative — money that left, written with the opposite sign.
Sensitivity Total $103.2B-$159.7B across defensible treatments (share 42.0%-44.3%); the raw signed sum ($46.7B, 34.4%) is indefensible. Tested three ways: filers' own amendments flip signs in one direction only (12 of 12); the accounting identity gives median implied P&L of +2.1% under absolute value against +2.5% for clean control quarters, versus -31.5% keeping the raw sign; and SALES_FLOW is negative in 1 cell of 19,402.
Original vs amendment on duplicate filings
Prefer amendments and latest filings — the N-PORT original-vs-amendment preference is kept.
Sensitivity Changes the total by $0.000B: 503 of 19,402 cells carry two observations, 483 of them original + amendment.
Month attribution inside each quarterly filing
MON1/MON2/MON3 are the three months preceding the report date, per the SEC field definitions; REPORT_ENDING_PERIOD is the fiscal-year end, not the period covered, and is never used.
Sensitivity Verified against the March 2020 crash: for 2,233 funds over $0.5B, median unrealized appreciation was -0.49% / -6.99% / -11.95% by slot against actual monthly moves of -0.2% / -8.2% / -12.4%, replicated at two other report dates. REPORT_ENDING_PERIOD differs from REPORT_DATE in 259,377 of 341,049 rows — using it would corrupt every attribution.
Renamed funds
13 series renamed out of the defined-outcome vocabulary are held out and disclosed rather than counted.
Sensitivity The flows say the product changed, not just the label: median top-two-month flow concentration fell from 76% before the rename to 46% after. Counting a fund on the strength of a name it no longer uses would inflate the total.
Classification rules
Name-based, then reviewed by hand; matched against every name a series ever filed under, not just its current one; every stem in the pattern is open-ended because a digit follows product words in this market (Buffer10, Floor5, Floor15). The 29 exclusions are each recorded with a reason in research/measurement.json, so any single call can be challenged on its own.
Sensitivity The word-boundary trap bit three times (Buffer10, Floored, Floor5/Floor15) before the pattern went open-ended; anyone extending this should assume a digit follows any product word.
Coverage claim
45 defined-outcome-adjacent terms outside the classification regex were scanned across all 18,750 filers; all 195 genuinely outcome-flavoured hits were read one by one.
Sensitivity A name-independent screen (flow concentration) corroborates but cannot establish coverage — it catches only 68% of known defined-outcome funds. So the defensible claim is: no issuer using recognisable defined-outcome vocabulary is absent. Not "no issuer is absent."
Corrected registry figures
Figures that replaced overturned copy, from the module of record (figures.py) — each pinned to its source, its date, and its denominator.
Of customer claimant cases closed January-June 2026, 272 (21%) were decided by arbitrators: 197 after a regular hearing, 15 by special proceeding, 60 on paper — most cases in the forum end some other way.
numerator: 272 (21%) were decided by arbitrators · denominator: customer claimant cases closed January-June 2026 · as of 2026-06 · FINRA Dispute Resolution Statistics, "How Arbitration Cases Close" table, finra.org/arbitration-mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics — re-fetched and reproduced 2026-08-01 (research/intake/05_LAWYER-NEEDS.md, N-019)
Vintage & reproduction
Cross-check against the bundled classify output (research/measurement.json): candidates 654, excluded 29 (each with a recorded reason: 29 entries), ladders held out 30, counted 582, ETFs 471, measurable 449 — matches the flagship block above.
| source | current through |
|---|---|
| buffer-fund measurement | SEC Form N-PORT structured data, 2019 Q4 - 2026 Q2 (27 quarters); independently audited 2026-07-28 |
| market-wide fund flows | 2025-05 to 2026-06 (14 months bundled) |
| base rates (baserates.py) | 2026-07 |
| corrected registry figures (figures.py) | 2026-06 |
| bundled source: roster | 2026-10-02 |
| bundled source: prices_spy | 2026-07-27 |
| bundled source: prices_underlyings | 2026-07-28 |
| bundled source: enforcement | 2026-10-15 |
| bundled source: funds_learned | 2026-10-16 |
| bundled source: flows | 2025-05 to 2026-06 |
Reproducing it python3 fetch_nport.py → python3 universe.py → python3 classify.py — 29 exclusions, each recorded with a reason in research/measurement.json; independently audited 2026-07-28 by a separate agent with no stake in the result, instructed to break it. N-PORT original-vs-amendment preference kept: amendments and latest filings are preferred throughout. Source: https://www.sec.gov/files/dera/data/form-n-port-data-sets/